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The US National Security Strategy: a challenge to the peace movement
Advisory report for Pax Christi Netherlands
Ben Schennink1
The war waged in Iraq by the United States, the United Kingdom and their allies was strongly
condemned and opposed by Pax Christi. In a joint statement of February 13, 2003, Pax Christi
and Cordaid, the Dutch Catholic co-financing organization for development and humanitarian
aid, declared that the war was unjust, not self-evident and not unavoidable. They called for a
policy of strict inspections for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction by the United Nations (UN)
and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for stricter containment of the Iraqi
regime by reinforcing UN control of imports and exports, for the posting of UN human rights
observers, for the UN to insist on free access for humanitarian organizations and for a UN
Iraq tribunal. Similar positions were taken by Pax Christ International and other sections of
Pax Christi, and the war was strongly opposed in Europe and the US by many organizations
for peace and justice and many churchesi.
Many declarations said the military action was unjust because other avenues had not been
exhausted. The mobilization and lobby in favor of strong, coercive diplomacy through the UN
and opposed to military action influenced public opinion, with the majority opinion, even in
the US, supporting this course. Although the campaign failed to prevent the war, Pax Christi
and other peace organizations can build on its results. Both the peace movement’s failure and
its results are a product of the new US National Security Strategy (NSS) published on
September 17 2002ii.
The NSS introduced pre-emptive war as an explicit element in the US’s security policy. It
argues that deterrence and containment are not effective against terrorists and rogue states that
are prepared to use weapons of mass destruction.
The doctrine of pre-emptive war is diametrically opposed to the peace movement’s
commitment to a policy of no war or pre-emptive peace: it undermines international
cooperation, non-proliferation and disarmament and, in particular, the strengthening of
international law and international institutions that have institutionalized a variety of
mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of disputes and that accept military action only as a
last resort.
                                                
1 Center for International Conflict Analysis and Management (CICAM), University of Nijmegen;
e-mail: B.Schennink@mailbox.kun.nl. The sections on international law are based on texts and ideas put forward
by Prof. Nico Schrijver of the Free University of Amsterdam, the sections on proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction on texts and ideas put forward by Dr. Tom Sauer of Leuven University. The author would like to
thank Prof. Paul de Waart, Jan Gruiters, Marjolein Wijninckx, Prof. Ann Pauwels and Jan ter Laak for their
comments on earlier drafts; participants at the conference of the International Dialogue Forum held in The
Hague on May 25 and 26, 2003, the forum discussion in Utrecht on June 7, 2003 and the members’ council of
Pax Christi on June 28, 2003 have also contributed to this report through their comments.
4The US National Security Strategy
PRE-EMPTION IS A LEGITIMATE AND UNCHALLENGED DEFENSE
In his address to the UN General Assembly on September 12, 2002, President Bush urged the
UN to take decisive action against Iraq’s defiance of UN resolutions on the removal and
destruction of weapons of mass destruction. Bush said: “We want the United Nations to be
effective, and respectful, and successful. We want the resolutions of the world’s most
important multilateral body to be enforced”. He added: “But the purposes of the United States
should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced – the just demands
of peace and security will be met – or action will be unavoidable”iii. The National Security
Strategy was published five days later. It made clear to the Security Council’s members and
the world that the US had added a new element to its security policy. It would take pre-
emptive action to “prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with
weapons of mass destruction”. “Our enemies” were “rogue states and their terrorist clients”iv,
one of which was Iraq.
The US pressure contributed to the virtually unanimous approval of Security Council
Resolution 1441 on the resumption of weapons inspections by the UN and the IAEA. In the
Security Council’s evaluation of the inspections’ results, the US argued that Saddam Hussein
was not complying with the resolution but it could not convince a majority in the Security
Council to grant permission for military intervention to force Iraqi compliance. Rather than
wait for permission, the US and its allies initiated “pre-emptive action” on March 22, 2003. It
showed that the policy outlined in the NSS was not a mere paper policy and the wording of
the NSS makes it clear that the threat of pre-emptive action is not restricted to Iraqv.
Together with the threat of pre-emption, the explicit policy to “build and maintain our
defenses beyond challenge”vi is a second element in the US’s new security strategyvii.
Enormous investments must make the US’s military strength so great that it cannot be
matched by any power in the worldviii. The US is the only superpower and wishes to remain
so. As such, it is claiming the right to pre-empt what it defines as an imminent threat and is
claiming the right to take action, as in the case of Iraq, without UN consent.
PRE-EMPTIVE WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
The US National Security Strategy claims that international law recognizes pre-emption if
there is an “imminent threat of an attack” but its legitimacy depends on the degree of
imminence.
The report adds that the concept “imminent threat” should be adapted “to the capabilities and
objectives of today’s adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists [...] rely on acts of terror and,
potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction — weapons that can be easily concealed,
delivered covertly, and used without warning. [...] To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by
our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively”ix.
International lawyers accept the first part of the argument but reject the second. Schrijver, for
example, concurs that the right to pre-emptive self-defense is recognized in international law
and is also in agreement with the UN Charter but notes that it is limited to acute danger or
direct threat, also in the case of terrorist violence. A victim state cannot invoke the right to
self-defense in order to justify its attacking another state that, in its opinion, is a supporter or
potential supporter of terroristsx.
5Hendrickson makes a comparable point from the perspective of international relations. He
writes: “Though styled a doctrine of ‘pre-emption’, it is actually a doctrine of preventive war.
Pre-emptive war is when force is used only when it is apparent that the enemy is on the verge
of striking, ‘leaving no moment for deliberation’. Preventive war is the first use of force to
avert a more remote though still ostensibly formidable danger. It has a simple liturgy,
historically sanctioned in the endless wars of the European state system. War, the advocates
of prevention say, is inevitable anyway, so let’s fight it under circumstances of our own
choosing. In the present case, we are told that once Iraq or other evil states develop the
capability to hit us, they will hit us. Ergo, we must strike to avert the threatened calamity, and
sooner rather than later.
“Such a war is entirely distinguishable in justification from that which toppled al-Qaeda and
the Taliban in Afghanistan. Then the United States justifiably made war in response to direct
attacks on its soil. Since Saddam’s complicity in those attacks has not been alleged by the
administration, and cannot plausibly be inferred from the evidence thus far available, the
justification for the war must rest on the aforementioned logic of prevention. That may not
seem like much of a difference, but it is the difference in law between offensive and defensive
war, and between aggression and self-defense. It is directly contrary to the principle that so
often was the rallying cry of American internationalism in the twentieth century”xi.
A doctrine of preventive war undermines the international rule of law. Despite the President’s
remarks in the UN, the United States does not seem particularly interested in making the UN
and international law more effective. The NSS barely refers to the UN and ignores its Charter
completely. Instead, it claims: “It is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military
strength”xii. The US prefers force to lawxiii. This policy threatens the preference for law,
diplomacy and international cooperation expressed under American leadership since the
Second World War.
PRE-EMPTIVE ACTION, PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND US
POLICY
Since the danger of terrorists and rogue states using weapons of mass destruction reduces the
effectiveness of traditional deterrence and containment policies, pre-emptive action might be
necessary. Containment and deterrence are still US policies, however, and it will continue to
use them against rogue states. The NSS says “the United States will not use force in all cases
to pre-empt emerging threats”xiv and this seems to be confirmed by US policy on North
Korea. Nonetheless, the trauma of September 11 overturned the prevailing policy on weapons
of mass destruction: from deterrence and containment to pre-emption and missile-based
defense.
The policy developed in the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction of
December 2002xv seeks to deny, prevent or respond to the use of weapons of mass destruction
and is founded on the US’s continued possession and possible use of nuclear weapons. In this
area, too, the policy is better described as preventive than pre-emptivexvi.
The US wishes to maintain and even expand its nuclear military strength. It agreed with
Russia in 2002 that both countries would reduce the number of their strategic weapons to
2,000 each by 2012, whereby the old weapons might be kept in storage for possible use at a
later date. The US administration has announced plans for new ICBM and SLBM nuclear
6missiles and new bombers between 2000 and 2040 and will start research and development
studies on “mini nukes”.
The US is doing little to honor its undertaking as a nuclear weapon state to give “an
unequivocal undertaking […] to accomplish total elimination of [its] nuclear arsenal leading
to nuclear disarmament”. This is one of the 13 concrete undertakings made at the Review
Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2000xvii. Other concrete undertakings
made at the time will also not be fulfilled. The US has withdrawn from the Anti Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty and has made it clear that it will not ratify the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT). The US argued at the recent (April 2003) NPT PrepCom meeting that the
NPT’s main objective was to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, not nuclear
disarmament. It asked for, and accordingly received, the international community’s serious
consideration of the ongoing development of nuclear weapons by North Korea. A great deal
of attention was also paid to the possible development of nuclear weapons in Iranxviii. Given
these developments, it is doubtful that the NPT regime will be strengthened as the states
undertook in 2000 and “total nuclear disarmament” is a long way away.
The fifth Revision Conference of the Convention on Biological Weapons ended in
disharmony at the end of 2001. The hope that the many years’ negotiations would result in the
realization of a strong verification regime was dashed by America’s refusal to cooperate. The
US thought the agreements were not effective enough and feared, moreover, that they might
damage its own industries. It was agreed to hold a series of follow-up conferences to
determine how national measures to stop the production and proliferation of biological
weapons could be made more effective and to meet again in 2006xix.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Both elements of the National Security Strategy – the hegemonic power of the US and its
readiness to start a pre-emptive war if it deems one to be necessary – have serious
consequences for cooperation among the members of the international community. The war in
Iraq showed that the National Security Strategy sows divisions both between and within
nations, feeds resentment and revenge in many parts of the world and undermines effective
international cooperation. Such cooperation is necessary to tackle the problems of terrorism,
to promote the effective non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to counter the
problems that rogue, failed and weak states can cause for their citizens and the international
community. With the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union deeply divided, there is a
yawning gap in some countries between the government and the dominant public opinion.
The gap is particularly problematic in Arab countries whose governments are allies of the US.
As a consequence, the positive values that the US wishes to promote through its foreign and
security policy – “the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech;
freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and
respect for private property”xx – are more difficult to achieve because the international
community holds divergent opinions on how they should be promotedxxi. Owing to the deep
division and the unrelenting scrutiny of the US’s conduct, moreover, conflicts and crises that
do not interest the US – because, for example, they are not related directly to terrorism or the
dangers of WMD proliferation – do not receive the attention from the international
community that they deserve. The war in the Democratic Republic of Congo is such a case in
point. In addition, the further development of international regimes for disarmament,
verification and non-proliferation has been suspended and may even be reversed, as in the
case of the NPT negotiations.
7Challenges for the peace movement
The main challenge facing the peace movement is to counter these trends and developments.
The experiences of the last period of weapons inspections in Iraq show that coercive
diplomacy and international law can be effective alternatives to military force alone. The
strong message presented by the peace movement and churches informed the majority public
opinion in the US and Europe. The message was more than just an appeal to morals, it also
offered a concrete and convincing alternative rooted in diplomacy and international law. The
diplomacy was also effective because it was backed up by the US and UK military presence
in the region. A joint evaluation by peace organizations and churches in various parts of the
world could help find concrete ways to strengthen UN capacity for coercive diplomacy and
the role of international law in international relations.
STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
Proposals to strengthen international law and international institutions should consider three
points:
• In the first place, the problem of fighting terrorism. As an intergovernmental organization,
the UN is poorly equipped to combat attacks or threats from non-state organizations such
as terrorist groups. Measures are being discussed internally to give the UN more power.
The UN Commission for International Law, for example, has proposed increasing the
responsibility of states for terrorist groups operating within their jurisdictionsxxii. In
accordance with the advice of international lawyersxxiii, the peace movement should seek
more effective ways for the Security Council to combat terrorism through collective
defense rather than through individual states increasing their right to self-defense.
• The second point is humanitarian intervention. Although the purpose of the war was to rid
Iraq of weapons of mass destructionxxiv, a secondary objective was to remove the brutal
regime of Saddam Hussein. This reintroduced the question of humanitarian intervention to
the debate. The UN has very limited means to act in cases of genocide or other large-scale
violations of human rights. The principle of non-intervention in internal affairs restricts
the UN’s ability to intervene. The former Polish foreign affairs minister, Bronislaw
Geremek, recently suggested that limiting the sovereignty of states that violated human
rights on a large scale would give the UN more freedom to actxxv.
• The third point is that the UN’s capacity to act as a diplomat, inspector or a kind of global
police force is too limited and too dependent on the cooperation of its member states. This
was reiterated in the Brahimi report in 2000xxvi. All three instruments are needed to
conduct coercive diplomacy and combat terrorism within the framework of the
international rule of law. Brian Wicker recently argued “What is needed today is the
development of a global police effort to enforce law and order against those like Al Qaida,
who commit ‘terrorist’ crimes against humanity. Such a police effort, if it is made, will
not be a ‘war against terrorism’, but police-work on behalf of global law and order”xxvii.
Wicker proposes the implementation of article 47 of the UN Charter and the establishment
not of a “military staff committee” but of a “UN police staff committee”. The idea is
similar to the proposal for a standing UN rapid deployment brigade made by the Dutch
minister Hans van Mierlo in the UN in 1995xxviii. The Brahimi report of 2000 repeats this
call. In response to the Brahimi report, 56 members of the US House of Representatives
from both parties submitted a proposal in March 2001 for US support for the
establishment of a “UN rapid deployment police and security force”xxix.
8Promote non-proliferation and disarmament
US policy on nuclear non-proliferation raises a number of concerns:
• the disparity between states that may have nuclear weapons and those that may not makes
an effective non-proliferation policy difficult. The 1986 NPT requires all states to seek
total nuclear disarmament (article VI); this is repeated in the 13 undertakings given in
2000. The US’s policy undermines those undertakings and thus its own promise as a
nuclear weapon state to make serious efforts towards total nuclear disarmamentxxx;
• the US’s aggressive unilateral approach to proliferation may actually accelerate
proliferation, as illustrated by the case of North Korea;
• pre-emptive attacks against states that have weapons of mass destruction may fail and
provoke counterattacks with dreadful consequences;
• other nuclear states, such as India and Pakistan, may be encouraged to use the same pre-
emptive strategy.
“Pre-emption is not the model” to combat proliferation, according to Mohamed ElBaradei, the
director of the International Atomic Energy Agencyxxxi. Instead, he believes the collective
security system should be reinvigorated and modernized. ElBaradei also argues that chronic
disputes and weapons proliferation should be considered in parallel with each other as part of
an overall settlement. In the Middle East this would mean settling the Israeli-Palestinian
problem while earnestly seeking to establish a WMD-free zone in the region. This proposal
was repeated in the recent NPT PrepCom of 2003xxxii. Endorsement of these proposals by the
peace movement and the churches might help mobilize public and political support for them
in Europe, the US and the Middle East. The peace movement should also cooperate with the
New Agenda Coalition in the UN to ensure that the undertakings given in 2000 to strengthen
the NPT regime, including the nuclear weapon states’ promise of total nuclear disarmament,
are realized insofar as possible in 2005.
Strengthening verification of the development and possession of biological weapons should
also receive more attention in the years ahead than it does at present. The European countries
that called for a powerful verification regime in 2001 have done no more than conclude such a
treaty with like-minded states in order to keep the US on board. If the 2006 Review
Conference is to be a success, the peace movement must urge those countries to take the
initiative for a new treaty with a strong and broad verification regime. An initiative by the
Netherlands might lead to the treaty’s executive organization being located in The Hague,
where it could build up a good working relationship with the organization that monitors
compliance with the prohibition on chemical weapons, which is also located in The Hague.
IMPROVE THE CLIMATE FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
A serious challenge facing the peace movement is the creation of a climate that is conducive
to international cooperation between states and citizens. Such a climate is of vital importance
to end humanitarian crises such as those in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Liberia
and to find lasting solutions to the problems in the Middle East, the Balkans, Afghanistan and
elsewhere. It is also a precondition for strengthening and developing the disarmament regimes
applicable to biological and chemical weapons, anti-personnel mines and small arms and for
strengthening international law, for example through the International Criminal Court, which
commenced in 2002, and the UN itself
The peace movement can make a start by intensifying international cooperation between
organizations and citizens throughout the world and by developing a joint agenda for concrete
issues that mobilize public support. This would help create a more conducive climate for
9international cooperation and would also encourage cooperation with like-minded states. This
has been demonstrated by the successful campaigns to ban anti-personnel mines, to found the
International Criminal Court and to ban the use of child soldiers. Through these campaigns,
which had specific and concrete goals, the peace movement found that international
cooperation with organizations and like-minded states can produce significant results in a
short period of time even if the US or other superpowers do not cooperate.
Many of the proposals considered above are included in or are consistent with the strategic
agenda that Javier Solana presented to the European Council in Thessaloniki on 20 June
2003xxxiii. The key strategic goals for a safer Europe, according to Solana, are: to extend the
security zone around Europe; to strengthen international order; and to counter threats by
means of anti-terrorism and anti-proliferation measures and the reconstruction of failed states.
Realising these goals, according to Solana, will require: the members to conduct a more active
and coherent policy; Europe to be better equipped for its task through the combination of its
members’ diplomatic, military and civil resources; and greater cooperation with partners
worldwide.
Solana’s agenda provides peace organizations that wish to promote international cooperation
as an alternative to the US strategy of prevention and military force with an excellent
opportunity for cooperation with like-minded states. The outcome might help peace
organizations and public opinion in the US to change government policy and to put US
foreign policy back on its old track of strengthening the international legal order and
promoting international cooperation as routes to peace and security in the US and the world.
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